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ABSTRACT
At present, the Federal Communications Commission assigns radio
licenses following a determination of the public interest. Whenever
mutually conflicting license applications are filed, the Commission holds
a comparative hearing. This assignment mechanism has been criticized as
cumbersome and unrealiable, and three alternatives have been proposed:
increasing the available spectrum, and either auctions or lotteries of
radio licenses.
This paper presents an analysis of the present system and these
°	 alternative arrangements for assigning rights to the frequency spectrum
for the Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS). Although MDS is a rela-
tively minor radio service, it serves as a prototype for message distri-
bution services with a large potential for use in business communications.
Moreover, the way in which the initial batch of ADS licenses was assigned
provides a unique opportunity for empirical work on the economics of the
licensing process.
Briefly, the analysis suggests that the present system of assignments
by comparative hearing is indeed a costly way to select applicants.
Increasing the spectrum allocation by an amount sufficient to eliminate
hearings will create more assignments than will be demanded by ADS in many
areas of the country, wi:ich is wasteful if other uses are foreclosed.
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Auctions or lotteries with free resale of licenses, offer more efficient
selection mechanisms. Moreover, because there is free entry into the
license process, each of the alternatives has interesting distributional
applications, which are brought out in the paper.
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C1.
When government controls a scarce resource, and licenses private
individuals to use it, it must decide how to assign the license. The
radio frequency spectrum is such a resource, and this paper presents an
economic analysis of the method used in the United States to assign
rights to the spectrum: licensing it to individuals following a compa-
rative hearing intended to determine which of several competing license
i
applicants will best be able to serve the "public interest."
Two alternative assignment mechanisms, currently under discussion
by policymakers, also are analyzed: auctions and lotteries of licenses.
A third alternative--avoiding the problems of the present system by
allocating enough spectrum to eliminate competing applications--also is
being considered. This paper compares these proposals to hearings,
examining how all three alternatives affect (1) the use of the resource,
and (2) the distribution of the benefits from its use.
A particular example, Federal Communications Commission (FCC) licens-
ing of radio stations in the Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS) is
used throughout the paper. Although MDS is a relatively minor radio
service, its history provides a useful focus for the analysis. For
example, data on the behavior of license applicants are easier to inter-
pret for MDS than for other services. Also, the FCC has recently proposed
the use of auctions or lotteries as an alternative to awarding MDS
licenses by comparative hearing Y This makes the results of the analysis
particularly timely. However, the general conclusions are relevant to
radio regulation generally.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents back-
ground on MDS, surmarizes the historical development of the service, and
discusses the use of comparative hearings to award radio licenses.
Section 3 discusses the recently proposed alternatives to comparative
hearings, Section 4 presents an economic analysis of the use of compara-
tive hear ngs, using a model of the assignment process. The model pro-
vides efficiency and distributional outcomes of the present system.
Section S presents a parallel analysis of auctions, lotteries, and of a
possible increase in the number of channels allocated to MDS. Finally,
Sectiot, 6 summarize: the policy consequences of the alternatives.
G
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Multipoint distribution service is a relat:v*_ly new interstate
common carrier service used for broadcasting of multiply-addressed
material to different fixed receivers. ?/ In the top fifty television
markets, MDS has been allocated two 6-MHz channels in the frequency band
2150-2162 MHz. (A 6-14iz bandwidth is the standard one for a television
signal.) In other markets a single 6-MHz channel is allocated, along
with a 4-MHz channel.
2.1 Histor
MDS did not assume its present form until 1974. Prior to 1970, it
had only a 3.5-MHz allocation. The FCC apparently thought that this
service would operate as a "transmitter for hire," a sort of wideband
counterpart to the radio common carrier service in mobile radio (CATJ,
1977). In 1970, the FCC added 2.5-MHz to the service, making trans-
mission of a television signal possible.
The rules for the present service were established in 1972, and in
1974 the second MDS channel, with the 6-Mliz capacity needed for a tele-
vision signal in the top 50 television markets, was allocated.!/ The
Commission's decision in this case fixed MDS in its present form, and
initiated its growth period. This can be seen by considering the nu.:.ber
of stations tabulated in different editions of the Television Factbook.
Prior to the Factbook edition for 1974/5, there is no listing whatever
for MDS. Table 1 shows the number of licenses and construction permits
issued since that time. The compound annual growth rate for licenses
shown in the table is about 48 percent annually.
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Table 1
Growth of HDS Licenses and Permits*
Time
Period
No. of
Licenses
No. of
Permits
1974/5 7 18
1976 13 61
1977 22 74
1978 44 100
1979 54 66
* Excludes two users of the 4 -MHz Channel 2A
Source: Television Factbook, for years noted (Vol's 43 to 47)
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At present, ?IDS is used primarily to distribute pay television pro-
grams to cable television systems, hotels, apartment complexes and the
like. Consequently, the 4-MHz channel, which cannot carry a standard
television signal, has been very little used. The growth shown in the
table is entirely in the 6-MHz assignments. however, MDS has the capa-
bility to distribute "viewdata" or "teletex" information services to
businesses and households. As the costs of MDS receiving equipment have
dropped, such applications have been increasingly discussed, and, at the
time of writing, it seems likely that one or more such business informa-
tion systems soon will be operating on a commercial basis.
Normally, an MDS transmitter operates at a power of 10 Watts,
although powers of up to 100 Watts are permitted. MDS signals propagate
along the line of sight at these power levels. Typically, reception is
possible up to 15 miles from the transmitter, and the signals can pene-
trate some structures up to 8 miles from the transmitter site. Because
the two available assignments are in adjacent frequency bands, special
coordination of transmitters is required to control interference if
spacing between MDS stations is under 50 miles (FCC Rules, 21.902
For a further technical description of MDS, see CATJ (1977).
Immediately following the FCC's 1974 decision cn "IDS, a large number
of license applications were filed. Because the number of licenses avail-
able was so restricted, many of these applications conflicted, in the
sense that licensing one applicant necessarily prevented the Commission
from licensing other applicants. Table 2 shows the multiple application
situation in late 1975, about a year after the FCC's decision. The table
i
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Table 2
Number of Applicants for MDS Licenses
(September 1975)
Number
Applications
Frequency of Occurrence
-
Applications for Each
For An Assignment Channel
1 21
2 49
3 35
4 20
5 9
6 4
7 7
8 3
C
Source: Television Factbook, Vol. 45 (1976)
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Pshoos the frequency with which different numbers
tions were filed for the same assignment. Under the present rules,
discussed below, a comparative hearing is required whenever there are
two or more applications. Thus, the table indicates a need for 127 hear-
ings, 100 of which are for assignments in the top fifty television
markets. That is, mutually exclusive applications were filed for every
available assignment in the largest markets.
As can be seen, the frequency distribution is highly skewed.
The mode and the median are both three, butt only one-sixth of all
assignments had more than four applications.
According to the FCC (Docket 80-116, p. 4), the multiple application
situation was stable between 1976 and 1978--settlements among contending
applicants roughly equal new conflicting applications so the t the back-
log of unresolved conflicts was constant. Beginning in June, 1978, a
large number of new conflicting applications for channel 1 assignments
were filed.
Most cases involving a conflict are settled without a full hearing.
The contending applicants generally consolidate their ventures, resulting
in one amended application. Robinson (1978) reported that of 147 applica-
tions filed by 1975, 73 remained to be settled in 1978. Only 4 applica-
tions had been settled by a hearing, while 25 had been settled prior to
designation for a hearing. and another 45 had been settled before the
heating actually took place. The FCC is said to have encouraged such
pre-hearing settlements by proceeding slowly with the hearing process,
but acting quickly as soon as a settlement resulted in a single applica-
tion.
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By aid-1980, there were 127 licensss for channel 1, with an addi-
tional 225 applications pending. Only 2 licenses had been authorized
for channel 2, with 185 applications pending. All of the channel 2
applications were mutually exclusive, as were 131 of the channel 1
applications.4J
2.2 Legal Background on Assignment k Comparative Hearing
One solution to the problem of multiple applications is to increase
the number of assignments by increasing the spectrum allocation. This,
in fact, is under consideration by the FCC at the time of writing. But.
such increases are not always easy to make. since they take place at the
expense of other actual or potential uses of spectrum. Moreover, because
there is no formal market in the radio spectrum, there are no price
signals to help indicate how much of an increase is desirable. Thus, in
the case of MDS as in many other cases, the FCC must ration the available
assignments among the applicants. Under its procedures, this rationing
requires comparative hearings among all competing applicants.
The background behind the decision to use hearings is as follows.
Section 309(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 requires the Commission
to award a license if it determines that the public interest, convenience
and necessity will be served by so-doing. Section 309(e) of the Act
states that if the Commission cannot make such a finding the applicant
is entitled to a rearing.
In 1945 the Supreme Court deci'-1 a case involving mutually exclusive
applications for a broadcast license. In Ashbacker Radio Co. v_._ FCC,
326 U.S. 327 (1945), the court held that when there are mutually exclusive
L
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applications, grantini► one without hearings an both deprives the losing
applicant of its opportunity for a hearing. The Court ruled that it
was not sufficient to set a hearing on the losing applicant's application
after awarding the license, because this would place on the loser the
additional burden of showing that the competitor's license should be
denied, as well as showing that it is in the public interest to grant
his own application (326 U.S. 331).
The Commission's reaction to Ashbacker has been to hold a simul-
taneous hearing on all competing applications whenever they are mutually
exclusive.5/ In the case of MDS, the initial case (Peabody Answering
Telephone Service, SS FCC 2d 626 (1975)) established five factors on which
evidence was to be taken:
1. Efficient frequency use.
2. The nature of the services and facilities proposed and their
relationship to the service requirements in the licensee's
service area.
3. Quality and reliability of service.
4. The proposed tariff for the service, and the tariff's
relation to costs.
S. Managerial, promotional and entrepreneurial abilities of
the applicants.
In the early cases (.eviewed in Docket 80-116), the applicants were
awarded "preferences" based on evidence on each of these points, with
the overall award being made on the basis of these preferences.
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While no general conclusions are possible from the few cases which
have been decided, it appears that in a number of instances no differ-
ence between the applicants is found. For instance, technical factors
seemed often to be similar for each applicant. Moreover, there is at
least one instance in which the hearing process apparently induced appli-
cants to make their applications similar (Docket 80-116, pp. 7-10): in
several early cases, the winning applicant was awarded preference for
quality and reliability of service because it proposed to offer a "hot
standby" transmitter. This decision apparently induced a flurry of
amendments to pending applications adding a hot standby transmitter.
While the evidence is sparce, it seems likely that in many compara-
tive hearing situations the Commission probably could make a public
interest finding in favor of more than one of the competing applicants if
there were no competition. That is, in many cases many applicants are
technically and financially capable of providing the service, and can
demonstrate to the Commission providing the service would promote the
public interest, convenience or necessity. However, because the radio
frequency spectrum used to provide the service is scarce, so that its use
by one individual denies it to others, the uses proposed by the competing
applicants are mutually incompatible. Spectrum scarcity is the root
cause of the "problem" of comparative hearings.
t ^'
i.
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3. ALTERNATIVES TO COMPARATIVE HEARINGS
C,
	
In 1980 the FCC began to consider significant changes to the rules
governing MDS, opening three dockets on various questions, two of which
are relevant to the hearing problem. General Docket 80-112 proposes a
reallocation of spectrum which would combine the existing KIDS allocation
with the allocations for the Private Operational Fixed (Microwave)
Service (POFS) and the Instructional Television Fixed Service (ITFS).
The reallocation would create a total of 33 television bandwidth channels
for the three services. MDS would have a total of twelve channels as its
"primary" allocation (i.e., MDS applications would have priority in these
,
channels). IFTS and POFS would have primary allocations of eleven and
ten channels respectively. In addition, if all primary channels in a
given service area are occupied but one of the other 21 channels is
available, an MDS station could be licensed to use one of the latter
channels. If adopted, this proposal will provide at least six times as
many channels to MDS as now are available. Moreover, multiple applica-
tion cases could be settled by assigning additional unused channels in
the primary allocations of either ITFS or POFS.
The second proceeding is Common Carrier Docket 80-116, a notice of
inquiry and proposed rulemaking into methods for awarding licenses. This
proceeding makes certain changes in the Peabody rules listed above
(essentially, only evidence on points 1, 3 and 4 is now required), and
requests comment on the use of several mechanisms intended to expedite
the assignment process. One such mechanism is termed the "paper record"
hearing. As the name suggests, this mechanism relies on written presen-
tations by applicants rather than oral argument. However, the Commission,
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noting that "our recent experience reveals a trend toward fewer and
C	 fewer differences ... (between applicants]," and that in the near future,
we may find ourselves in a position where no differences exist at all or
where such differences cannot be rationally measured against a public
interest standard ..."6/ goes on to propose the use of two other
mechanisms--a lottery or an auction--to select a licensee.
If the lottery is used, a random drawing would take place among all
"qualified" applicants--that is, applicants meeting some prespecified
criteria. The present rules for MDS essentially require qualification on
financial, technical and legal grounds. A determination of technical and
legal qualifications can be made by a staff evaluation of the applicants'
proposals; but the financial requirement is more difficult to enforce.
The financial qualifications of an applicant basically require the abil-
ity to construct and operate the proposed station. However, the notice
of inquiry (p. 42) points out that a station must be constructed within
eight months of the time a construction permit is awarded. Consequently
a failure to have adequate financial backing is likely to be revealed
quickly, and, the construction permit having expired, the assignment would
again become available to other users. The lottery proposal analyzed in
this paper therefore assumes that financial requirements are dispensed
with. Put somewhat differently, a qualified applicant in a multiple
application situation would be anyone whose application would have been
granted in the absence of a mutually conflicting application.
The auction proposal is an outgrowth of a plan suggested by Robinson
(1978). The plan discussed by the Commission would auction cuff assignments
C
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to applicants, subject to minimal qualification standards. '
standards would be no higher than those for the lottery, and uvuiu uc
I
set considerably lower because the auction itself is to be relied upon
as a selection tool. (For instance, financial qualifications art
unnecessary in the auction, since a participant in an auction must be
prepared to make a substantial payment.)
The actual auction could be conducted in several ways. From the
viewpoint of economic efficiency, the so-called "English" or philatelists'
auction has much to recommend it. Under the sealed bid version of this
scheme the highest bidder wins, but pays the second highest price bid.
Vickery (1461) and others-Z/ have analyzed this arrangement, and have
shown that it has several valuable properties. For example, it causes
every bidder to state his estimate of the true value of the object of
the auction. (Stated formally, bidding the true estimate is a Nash
equilibrium jtrategy for each participant in the auction.) As a conse-
quence, the English auction should award the object to the bidder who
values it the most. Also, it is relatively easy to determine one's
bidding strategy, so that the costs of deciding how to bid are minimized.
The analysis in Section 5 of this paper assumes that the auction is
English.
Licenses would be issued to the auction's winner on the same operat-
ing and technical grounds currently specified in the FCC's rules, eliminat-
ing the need to develop mechanisms to resolve interference. The license
could run for the statutory five-year term, and would be re-auctioned at
r
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its expiration. (To facilitate re-allocation of spectrum, all licenses
L
	 in a given region would expire together.) The license's price would be
a lump sun paid to the FCC. Transfer of the license would be allowed to
any other party meeting the qualifications of a license holder.
t
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4. A MODEL OF THE APPLICATION DECISION AND COMPARATIVE HEARINGS
In Table 2 we saw that the FCC's 1974 decision on MDS caused a
large number of license applications to be filed. Multiple applications
were received for all 100 assignments in the top 50 television markets,
and for many of the single assignments available elsewhere. Because
these applications were filed more or less simultaneously, it is possible
to use data on the applicants to address the economic consequences of the
present system. It would be much more difficult to do this for larger
and older radio services, such as television broadcasting, because of
the time that has passed since licenses were first awarded. On the other
hand, licenses in these services are bought and sold after they are
issued. Levin (1964, 1971), Crandall (1977), Noll, Peck and McGowan
(1972), and others have used this data to analyze the economic behavior
of these license markets.
There are two crucial points about the present system of assignment.
First, the license awarded to the winning applicant. provides a limited,
legal monopoly. The value of any monopoly rents connected with the
license depend on several factors, including:
1. The amount of competition from substitute services,
2. The competition from other MDS licensees with overlapping
assignments,
3. Characteristics of the area being served, such as household
size or income, and CATV or MATV subscribership, or the
inherent desirability of the services being offered.
ff
Y
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The second point is that the hearing is a competitive process with
an uncertain outcome for which there are participation costs. Not sur-
prisingly, an inspection of the pattern of license applicants suggest a
kind of competitive equilibrium. For example, in those markets in 1975
where both MDS channels were available, applicants tended to divide
evenly. Table 3 shows the joint distribution of applications for the
two channels. In 13 out of 16 cases, the number of applications divides
`	 evenly between the two assignments. 9/
In other to assess the economic effects of the different assignment
mechanisms, one needs to know the value of a license, and how this value
is related to the factors listed above. Ideally, one would build a model
to explain the value of an MDS license as a function of the characteris-
tics of the community where the station is located, the number of compet-
ing applicants, the number and characteristics of competing services, and
the costs of obtaining a license. Sadly, most of the data needed for
cuh a model are unobservable. In particular, we lack direct observations
on the costs of obtaining a license.
However, we can use the data on applications to say qualitatively
how the license's value varies. The next subsection presents a simple
model that is consistent with the available data, and which suggests
that the competition for licenses is a substitute for the sort of price
competition that one would see if licenses were sold in a market.
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Table 3
Number of License Applications in
Market,. with Two Available Assignments
Number of Applications
for Channel One
	
2	 3	 4	 5 I To
2	 5	 5
Number of	 3	 1	 2	 1	 4Applications
for a Channel	 4	 3	 2	 5
TWO
	 5	 1	 1
6	 1	 1
	Total 1 7	 6	 2	 1 1 16
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4.1 Model Structure
Consider a particular ZIDS market, and let the index i run over all
possible assignments and markets. In any particular market, let Vi be
the value of the assignment. Vi can be thought of as the certain equiva-
lent of the present value of the future stream of profits dcr{ved by
exploiting the assignment. (As such, Vi includes any risk premium for
the uncertainty associated with operating the assignment.)
s
	
	 In practice, different applicants may value an assignment differ-
ently. There are several possible reasons for this, including different
perceptions of risks, or different estimates of revenues or costs by
applicants. (For example, some MDS operations are part of a chain of
systems, while others are locally owned and operated.) However, we will
take Vi to be the same for all applicants.
Vi
 will also vary from assignment to assignment. In particular, the
availability of competing assignments in the i th market will affect Vi,
because they offer a substitute service. In IDS, the total number of
competing assignments Ni , and hence the number of competing systems, is
fixed by regulation, and can be taken to be an exogenous variable.
The second factor affecting the decision to apply for a license
is the cost of applying and participating in the hearing process. If a
hearing is required, the cost of participation may be quite high. It
will, in general, depend on the identities of the other participants.
For example, the cost to a locally owned and operated system may be
different from the costs for one of the "multiple station operators"
because the applicant will be called on to demonstrate different things
at the hearing.
(
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Vi/ni . C(ni ) (4.1)
We can now characterize the equilibrium that results after potential
applicants have decided separately whether or net to apply. This equi-
librium is defined by the standard free entry condition: after all
applicants have observed each other's behavior, only those for whom the
expected value of the assignment, exceeds the expected cost of obtaining
It will participate in the hearing. If (1) potential applicants have
the same Vi , (2) the same costs of participation, and (3) the same
probability assessments of their chance of winning, the equilibrium
number of applicants n i will equate expected value to expected costs,
as follows:
where C(ni) is the cost of participating in the hearing using a linear
approximation to the cost function given. For a single applicant, and
n  has been treated as if it were a real number. 10/
Using a Taylors' series expansion gives:
C(n i )	 C(n) + C' (n) (n i - n)	
(4.2)
Co _ C1ni
where n is the expected value of n i . Substituting the equation (4.2)
into equation (4.1) and solving for the number of applicants gives:
ni (/C2
+ 4C
1 V
"1 - Cv)/(2 Cl )	 (4.3)
Linearizing this equation gives the following approximate relationship:
n  :: Vi /Co	(4.4)
This approximation will be reasonable provided C
1 V1
« C0/4.
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This equation says that the expected number of applicants is roughly
proportional to the value of the assignment, where the consent of propor-
tionality is the "fixed" cost of application.
4.2 Data Used to Estimate the Model
This ratio depends on other variables, such acs the characteristics
of the market, of the applicants, and competing licenses, and we can
obtain some data on these quantities. In particular, the Television
Factbook tabulates MDS license, construction permits and application
activities since 1975. The Factbook also contains the following data
for each city where at least one application was on file at the time of
publication:
e whether a license or permit had been granted,
r	 s the identity of the applicants, and
• the channel they were filing for.
This information was used to find the number of applicants n  and the
'	 number of available assignments N i . In addition, it seems reasonable
that the success or award of a license for one KIDS operation in a market
would convey information to the applicants for the second license about
their prospects. This suggests that for channel 2 applications, one of
the independent variables affecting V i
 would be whether or not a channel
1 application had already been awarded, or whether it was still to be
awarded. This variable was also derived from the Factbook.
In addition to this data, some measure of the size of the KIDS market
was obviously important. The activity variable chosen for this study is
the Arbitron figure for ADI (c.:ec, of dominant influence) television
-20-
n t
Chouseholds for the television market that contains the application. This
variable has several unsatisfactory features. First, it is available
only for large markets. Consequently, the regression reported below may
not hold for small markets. Second, ADI households measures the poten-
tial audience in a larger geographic area than an MDS station can serve.
Data on a more detailed geographic basis could not be obtained. However,
there are several ways to correct for this problem: one can allocate
portions of the ADI figure in markets served by more than one MDS station.
(The most important cases where this could be done are New York, Los
Angeles, and the San Franctcco Bay Area.) Alternatively, one could
exclude observations on such shared markets. The results reported below
do not include either of these adjustments because when they were used
in regressions not reported here (but available from the author) they
had no material effect on the results.
Another factor that might affect n  is due to the circumstances of
particular applications. In particular, several large multiple system
operations (MSO's) participated in certain hearings but not others. It
might be argued that if one or more of these systems participated, other
applicants would be inhibited from entry. (This would be a form of the
f
"deep pocket" argument often made about the advantages of small and large
companies.) However, the inclusion of variables accounting for the
participation of these systems on the right hand side of a regression
equation explaining n  introduces a simultaneity problem, because these
variables reflect the decision of some of the applicants.
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Ideally, the solution to this simultaneity problem would be the
specification of additional equations for each decision. This would
suggest appropriate instrument variables. No such instruments are
obvious present. nor does the data allow us much liberty in this regard.
Thus, when we use these variables in some regressions, the possibility
o1 simultaneous equations bias must be kept in mind.
There are a number of other econometric points raised by the model
specified above, most of which are too complicated to deal with given
the available data. In particular, it should be pointed out that there
are two foram of truncation error involved with the data obtained in the
Factbook. First, the model deals with n  as if it were a real number,
whereas in practice it is an integer. Second, the Factbook never contains
information on towns where there are no applications, so that a form of
selection bias inevitably is present. Both these problems could, in
principle, be addressed by additional modeling of the selection factors,
coupled with the use of maximum likelihood estimation in place of ordinary
lease squares.11/
4.3 Regression Results
Table 4 shows the results of several ordinary least squares estimates
of the equilibrium relation equation (4.4). Overall, they support the
equilibrium model develops' '.n Section 4.1 above. The left-most equation
is estimated for the 106 cases in which there were at least two applica-
tions. The specification is the same form as that used by Levin (1964,
1971), in which the value of an assignment was known from market data.
As can be seen, the market size variable (log of AUI households) and the
presence of an already licensed channel 1 are both highly significant.
-22-
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Table 4
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS
Variable
Intercept
Ln (ADI households)
Number of Assignments
Available
Channel 1 already
licensed?
Single Application?
(Dependent Variable
is APPLICATIONS)
-3.911 -3.650 -3.404
(0.997) (0.954) (0.931)
1.322 1.270 1.223
(0.208) (0.198) (0.193)
-0.588 -0.560 -0.658
(0.329) (0.311) (0.355)
1.279 1.313 1.171
(0.185) (0.275) (0.273)
-1.432 -1.322
(0.385) (0.379)
Largest MSO was an
	 -0.0264
Applicant?
	 (0.363)
Other three top MSO ' s	 0.675
were applicants?
	 (0.317)
Standard error of estimate 1.091
	 1.061
	 1.027
R2	0.560	 0.620	 0.644
Number of Cases	 106	 115	 115
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CThe number of assignment variables has the expected sign, but has a
T-value of only -1.8. Since this variable takes on only two values
(one or two) there is probably not enough variation to give a significant
result.
The two right-hand columns show the effect of introducing additional
variables, with Cie nine single-applicant stations included. The middle
column shows results when a dummy variable for single applicant cases
was int!oduced. This variable was significant, but the other regression
coefficients were little changed. The right-most equation also contains
two dummy variables (which are, to repeat, endogenous) for the presence
of the largest MSO, or the second through fourth largest MSO, in a hear-
ing. (Two variables were included because the largest MSO, according
to industry sources, planned to operate a business communications network.
Consequently, its actions i- applying for licenses in different markets
might have been motivated by networking considerations.) As can be seen,
one of the two coefficients is significant but positive while the other
is not significantly different from zero. The hypothesis that both
coefficients are zero cannot be rejected at the S% level (F2,107 = 1.97).
None of the other coefficients are changed very much. The incorrect
sign and the lack of significance, coupled with the fact that these
variables are endogenous, has lead us to use the center equation in
Table 4 for the work d escriberi in the next section.
4.4 The Value of an MDS License
If we had external observations on the cost of hearings (C o ), we
could use one of the regression relationships to estimate the value of
-24-
Ithe license. Unfortunately, only anecdotal evidence is available.
Robinson (1976) estimated the costs of presenting an MDS at 15,000 to
35,000 dollars per participant, based on "rather sparse" information.
Discussions with industry sources indicate that this valu>;: is still
approximately correct, when inflation is adjusted for. Thu:i, we can
take these values as a rough interval estimate of C(n).
By Equation (4.1) above, this estimate of hearing expenses implies
that the typical comparative hearing in 1975, with 3.5 applicants,
involved a license valued at between $50,000 and $125,000 (3.5 x 15,000
L	 52,500, and 3.5 X 35,000 = 122,500). This estimate of the implied
value of an MDS license in 1975 obviously are only approximate, and
therefore we will take a "typical" station to be worth about $100,000.
i
However, it is interesting that they suggest that the value of the
television channel provided by MDS was strikingly less than the valueI
of a commercial television broadcasting license. 12/ The probable reason
for this disparity is that MDS, in 1975, was far from a mature business,
and there must have been considerable discounting present for uncertainty.
F
f
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S. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICII
C
C
	
	
The model estimated in the preceding section, along with some other
information introduced below, can be used to address the economic
effects of alternative policies for assigning spectrum. There are four
alternatives of interest:
1. The status !uo policy of continuing to make the assignments
by comparative hearing whenever there are more than two
applicants.
2. Allocate enough additional spectrum to the service so that
there is usually only one applicant for an assignment. This
eliminates the hearings without requiring any change in the
law.
3. Conduct a lottery for the assignment among all qualified
applicants.
4. Auction the assignments to the applicants, using, for example,
the "English" second price auction.
The economic implications of these policies are explored in the rest of
this section.
5.1 The Costs of the Present §Y-!!tem
As indicated in the preceding section, a typical MDS license (with
a value of roughly $100,000) might attract two to four applicants, each of
whom expected to pay between $15,000 and $35,000 for the right to compete
in a hearing. The private costs of obtaining a license if a hearing was
required could thus run from $30,000 to $1.40,000--i.e., to more than the
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license's value. It is therefore not surprising that (as noted above)
more than half of the cases that might have involved hearings were
settled without one. In fact, the value of the license itself (V i) is
probably a rough upper bound on the total private costs, because if the
sum of expenditures on hearings by all parties were to significantly
exceed the value of the license, a negotiated settlement in which all but
one of the parties dropped out of the case in return for some form of
compensation, would be in everyone's interest.
In view of this, it seems reasonable to take the typical private
costs of obtaining a license in 1975 at a hearing to be in the range
$30,000 to $100,000 for a "typical" assignment with three competing appli-
cations. In one sense, this cost is a transfer, because it is paid by
potential licensees to their lawyers, consultants and other experts on
matters of interest to the FCC. However, we will treat private costs as
real costs to society, and, as we will see, they can be significantly
altered under the other alternatives.
In addition to these private costs there are two additional cate-
gories of cost, one of which is a true welfare loss:
1. The administrative costs of the hearing to the spectrum
manager (e.g., the FCC), and
2. The opportunity cost of the spectrum, incurred because
the delay in the hearing process leaves the allocation
lying idle or underused.
Robinson (1978) presents an estimate of the administrative costs.
He estimated that at least two months of staff time would he required,
plus $1,900 in recording costs at the hearing itself. Using $60,000 at
r,
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the cost of a year of staff time.iri 1975, including an allowance for
	
t,	 overhead, this estimate implies a cost of about $12,000 per hearing.
As noted above, however, many of the potential hearings are not
held. If we assume that a month of staff time is needed in any case,
	
, `{-	 and use the data given above, we find that the average administrative
cost is about $5,400 (the average of four cases requiring a hearing and
70 others that do not).
The opportunity cost of an idle assignment depends on the value of
the assignment, the value of the spectrum in its next best use, the
delay needed to make the assignment, and the discount rate used. Robinson
reports that the typical time required to resolve a set of mutually con-
flicting applications by a hearing is 3 years. The opportunity cost is
therefore 3 years of the rental value of the license. Using a 10 percent
interest rate as the social rate of discount, 3 years of lost use of the
assignment amounts to about 25 percent of the value of the license. 13/
Since many cases are settled short of a full hearing, this fraction over-
states the loss. In the event of a settlement prior to a hearing, we
will take the administrative delay to be one year, resulting in a loss
of 9 percent in the license's value. The average fraction of value which
is lost is therefore 10 percent ((0.09 x 70 + 0.25 x 4)/74).
Finally, one needs some estimate of the value of the spectrum in an
alternative use. In the case of MDS in 1975, it is arguable that this
value is zero because no other service was authorized to use the same
frequency band. l4/ With these figures in mind, we can construct Table 5,
which shows the costs of the present system of assignment for the typical
system.
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CTable 5
Average Costs of Assigning
a "Typical" MDS License
f Administrative Cost
to FCC
Private Cost of
Representation
Opportunity Cost of
Idle Assignment
Total
$5,400
$30,000 - $100,000
$10,000
$45,400 - $115,400
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CAs can be seen from the table, the administrative costs (as
Robinson suspected), are relatively unimportant. The opportunity cost
of the unassigned licenses, and the costs of participation, dominate.
And, the overall costs almost equal the assignment's value.
eC
5.2 Distributional Consequences of Hearings
Accepting the estimates in Table 4 as roughly correct, it is
interesting to examine how the costs and benefits are distributed among
the parties to the selection process. Five groups can be identified as
potential gainers or losers:
1. The government,
2. The winning applicant,
3. The losing applicants,
4. The professional intermediaries (lawyers, consultants, and
so forth) who represent the competing applicants, and
5. The general public.
For the typical case with the costs summarized in Table 5, it can
be seen that the government is a loser in the game, since it costs
$12,000 to award the license if a hearing has to be held, and $5,000
otherwise. Naturally, these costs are passed along through the tax
system to the other four groups. (Practically speaking, this means
our fifth group, the general public.)
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CThe winning applicant receives a license typically worth $100,000.
C	 but pays representation costs of $15-35,000, so the winner's net gain is
$65,000 to $85,000. On the other hand, the losing applicants receive no
license but nevertheless must pay whoever represented them. Our fourth
group, the interme4iaries, are economic gainers, in the amount of $30,000
to $100,000. The general public bear the opportunity costs.
t 5.3 Implications 
of an Increased Spectrum Allocation
The first alternative policy to be considered is one that increases
the spectrum available. If one wishes to eliminate the delays and costs
associated with hearings, one possibility would be to increase the
allocation until there are enough assignments available to accommodate
all applicants without hearings. This, in effect, is what the proposed
expansion of the allocation for KIDS, coupled with sharing between MDS,
ITFS, and operational fixed services, might allow.
The regression model estimated in the preceding section can be used
to address this possibility in several ways. First, one can look at
the number of assignments that would have to be made available to
eliminate multiple hearings. To do this, set the left hand side of the
regression equation (n i) equal to 1 (i.e., set the expected number of
applicants to 1), and solve for the number of assignments N i . Evaluating
the number of assignments at the mean of Xn(ADI, households), and with the
two dummy variables equal to 1 (this is consistent with having n i = 1
and Ni
 > 1), we find that an estimate 5.13 assignments are required. For
comparison, the sample mean number of applicants in 1975 is 3.5.
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This estimate is biased, however, because the coefficient on N i is
random. Using the method of Tin (1965) for estimating the ratio of two
random variables gives an approximate estimate of the mean and its stan-
dard error, namely 6.67 i 3.83. Thus, in 1975 something like 7 assign-
C_	 sent would have been necessary to satisfy demand without resorting to
hearings.
The same calculation can also be made for individual cities. Table
6 (columns 2 and 3) shows the estimated mean and standard deviation of
the number of required assignments for 44 of the fifty largest television
markets.-L5/ As can be seen from the table, the largest markets apparently
could have accommodated as many as 16 ± 9 MDS stations in the long run.
Another way of analyzing the effect of an increased allocation is to
calculate the probability of having two or more applications if there are
Ni assignments available. To do this requires an assumption about the
distribution of the error term. In view of the many approximations made
up to now there is no clear choice. If we assume the errors are normal,
for example, we can calculate the appropriate probability in each market.
The results of such calculations are shown in Table 6, columns 4
and 5, for two different assumptions about the number of assignments
that would be allocated to MS. In the first case, it has been :assumed
that each television market had a total of twelve assignments available
(ten of them newly allocated, plus the two originally available). In
the second case, a tabulation of "unencumbered" channels in FCC Docket
80-112 has been used to give the total number of available channels.
f=-
-32-
TABLE 6	 MODEL PREDICTIONS FOR LARGE MDS MARKETS
i
Estimated Number of Probability Probability
channels needed to that more than that more than
give 1 application 12 Channels are the total
Total per assignment needed to give available
Available Standard 1 application channels are
Channelsl Mean_ Deviation per assignment needed
Atlanta, GA 22 9.24 5.04 11.89 6.69
Albany, NY 28 6.97 3.82 8.21 4.9
Baltimore, MD 18 8.86 4.84 11.2 7.45
Birmingham, AL 2 6.67 3.66 7.81 72.97
Boston, MA 4 11.77 6.46 17.54 86.33
Buffalo, NY 22 8.01 4.37 9.76 5.96
Chicago, IL 3 13.56 7.48 22.64 98.62
Cincinnati, OR 26 8.3 4.53 10.23 5.6
Cleveland, OH 2 10.81 5.92 15.18 97.16
Columbus, OH 13 7.54 4.12 9.04 8.34
Dallas, TX 5 10.11 5.53 13.63 56.91
Dayton, OH 27 6.98 3.82 8.22 4.97
Denver, CO 21 8.11 4.43 9.92 6.18
Detroit, MI 14 11.4 6.25 16.58 13.31
Ft. Worth, TX 16 10.11 5.53 13.63 9.62
Hartford, CN 33 8.36 4.56 10.32 5.08
Houston, TX 11 9.41 5.14 12.21 13.73
Indianapolis, IN 19 8.79 4.8 11.08 7.09
Kansas City, MO 32 8.3 4.53 10.23 5.07
Los Angeles, CA 2 14.43 7.98 25.49 99.84
Louisville, KY 7 7.24 3.96 8.6 17.61
Meaphis, TN 33 7.55 4.12 9.04 4.83
Miami, FL 3 9.33 5.09 12.06 82.05
Milwaukee, WI 5 8.26 4.51 10.16 39.59
Minreapolis, MN 18 9.47 5.17 12.34 7.98
New Orleans, LA 32 7.32 4. 8.72 4.81
New York, NY 5 16.4 9.11 32.78 96.36
Norfolk, VA 13 6.61 3.63 7.74 7.21
Okla City, OK 5 7.18 3.93 8.52 30.61
Philadelphia, PA 13 12.8 7.05 20.36 17.92
Phoenix, AZ 33 7.47 4.08 8.93 4.81
Pittsburgh, PA 33 10.19 5.57 13.79 5.7
Portland, OR 31 8.19 4.47 10.04 5.15
Providence, RI 12 8. 4.37 9.74 9.74
Rochester, NY 27 5.74 3.19 6.G8 4.52
San Antonio, TX 25 6.67 3.66 7.82 4.99
San Diego, CA 9 7.62 4.16 9.15 13.05
San Francisco, CA 5 11.69 6.42 17.33 S5.81
Seattle, WA 33 9.02 4.92 11.48 5.3
St. Louis. MO 33 9.64 5.27 12.67 5.51
Syracuse, NY 33 6.41 3.53 7.49 4.5
Tampa/St.Peter, FL 29 9.2 5.02 11.83 5.69
Toledo, OR 33 6.61 3.63 7.73 4.55
Washington, DC 25 !(1.83 5.93 15.23 7.103
I.	 Includes 2 channels at 2140-2152, plus channels listed as "unencumbered"
in FCC Docket 80-112, Appendix B.
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(This figure is shown in column 1 of Table 6, with the two original
channels included.)
As can be seen from this table, there are only four cities where the
probability that more than twelve assignments is needed exceed 0.20. Even
in New York. there is calculated to be about only a one third chance that
more than twelve assignments are needed. However, in 14 out of the 44
cities, there are already fewer than 12 channels available; not coinciden-
I	 tally, these tend to be the largest cities where the demand for YIDS assign-
ments, and for spectrum for use by other radio services, already is high.
These results tell us something about the likely effect of the
changes proposed in Docket 80-112. On the one hand. in all but the
largest markets the proposed allocation of additional spectrum will
probably eliminate the need for comparative hearings because the demand
for assignments will be less than the supply. On the other hand, hear-
ings will still be needed in the largest markets, for the most valuable
assignments.
More generally, the results in Table 6 illustrate a point about
so-called "spectrum scarcity." This phrase is usually used to describe
a situation where there the demand for spectrum (at a zero price, under
the present system) exceeds the supply. The results in the table show
that there is substantial variation in the value attached to the spectrum.
Hence, a system tha-, allocates spectrum nationwide almost inevitably
causes spectrum to be id..e or underused in some areas, while keeping it
"scarce" in other places.
f.
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COne solution to this problem has been suggested by Levin (1971),
namely increased use of "squatter's rights," secondary allocations which
must be vacated if anyone qualified for the primary service wants to use
an assignment. The analysis of how such a system of secondary and
primary rights would work raises a number of interesting questions which
are beyond the scope of this paper. For example, should side-payments
be allowed between different classes of user, so that, for example, an
NDS station using an assignment for which is primarily allocated to ITFS
could pay for the continued right to use the assignment. More generally,
how might allocations be made which encourage efficient inter-service
sharing of assignments, without requiring comparative hearings?
Turning to the costs of this method of avoiding comparative learn-
ings, we see that if we ignore the costs associated with allowing MDS
to use spectrum, rather than some other service, the apparent costs
fall dramatically. For the typical station now will have only one
applicant, and a license will probably issue in six months without
requiring a hearing. Moreover, if there is enough spectrum so that
everyone who wants to can enter, the losses in rent will be small
because competition will have reduced the rental value of a license
essentially to zero.
Of course, there are alternatives to MDS, and denying them spectrum
has costs. For example, the "unencumbered" channels in Table 6 are also
available for instructional television (ITFS) and private cicrowave
systems. But there is no information of their value (their licenses
were not even awarded in comparative hearings), and so it is not possi-
ble to make a cost estimate for this alternative.
-35-
C5.4 Implications of Auctions and Lotteries
G
	
	
If auctions or lotteries are used, the number of licenses available
will affect the amounts bid and the behavior of lottery participants.
For example, if the spectrum allocation is increased, the value of each
f.	 individual assignment falls because there are competing stations. Cense-
quently, the bids for licenses will fall to zero, and few individuals
will find the prize offered in the lottery worth the costs of competition.
Therefore, in this subsection we will assume that the spectrum allocation
is not increased. This assumption makes some of our calculations simpler,
because fewer assumptions are required. Moreover, it provides a clear
contrast to the alternative discussed in the preceding subsection, where
spectrum was increased but the market system was not allowed to operate.
As our calculations for the hearing suggest, the costs of an assign-
sent policy depend on several factors:
e The number of competing applicants and the implied value of
the assignment.
e The cost of participating in the selection process.
e The administrative costs of the selection process. and
e The time required to complete the selection process.
For the purposes of this illustration, Table 7 presents reasonable
values for these factors for each of the three hearing methods. The
reasons for choosing these values are discussed in the following; para-
graphs.
F
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Table 7
Factors Used to Assess Differences
Among Alternative Assignment Mechanisms
Comparative	 I
Hearing	 tottery	 Auction
Time Needed to Assign
License 3 years 6 months 6 months
Expected Cost of
Assignment to FCC Q 5,400 $5,000 $5,000
Expected Cost of
Obtaining Assignment
Per Competing Applicant $25.000 $1,000 $5,000
Number of Competing
Applicants 3.5 15 G
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As can be seen from the table, the factors chosen for the compara-
tive hearing are the same ones developed in the preceding section. We
have chosen the typical case, in which two applicants require a hearing,
and 3 years elapse before one of them is selected and begins operation.
The costs shown for this alternative are the ones developed in Table 3
above, except that $25,000 mid-point value of Robinson's range of $15-35
thousand has '.e-n used for the cost of representation.
Turning next to the lotter y
 and the auction, we have assumed that
6 months are required to complete the selection. This time estimate is
longer than the three months said by one source (CATJ) to be the time
required to process uncontested applications. But, additional time will
undou';tedly be needed to allow applicants to prepare for the auction
or lottery.
In the lottery, as in the comparative hearing, the number of appli-
cants depends on the cost of participating in the selection process and
the value of the license. As in the hearing, rational individuals will
be attracted by the chance of winning a valuable prize. If an unlimited
number of risk neutral individuals are qualified to operate a station,
additional applications will be received until the expected excess
profits are reduced to zero. For instance, if licenses are worth $50,000
and it costs $1,000 to apply for a license, there would be 50 applicants.
More realistically, risk aversion or some limit on the number of truly
qualified applicants may reduce the number who participate in the lotte r:.
On the other hand, lotteries of Federal oil leases are reported to have
attracted thousands of individuals, each paying a nominal fee for a small
-
chance at a large prize (Wall Street Journal, 1980). Overall, then, the
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Clottery could have anywhere from 10 or so up to 100 individuals in conten -
tion. It seems reasonable for our coat comparison to asstm t that 20
of these individuals would be found eligible. Each of these spends
resources worth perhaps $1 ,000, but has a chance at a price worth
$100,000. Such a gamble probably will be attractive to many people.
In our analysis below, we assume 20 applicants participate in the
lottery.
Now let us consider how the auction operates. In the table, we
have shown the costs of participation to be $5,000, representing the
$1,000 that is required to prepare: the application, and another $4,000
which represents the cast of planning, and bid preparation. As in the
other two assignment methods, potential bidders must weigh this cost
against their expected profits. But, it can be shown that the potential
profits of a bidder at an auction decline at a rata proportional to
1/n2 instead of 1/n, where n is the number of participants in the
auction.-L6/
 Consequently, if the licejnso is worth $100.000 and the
costs of participation area about $5,000, the number of bidders will
be about 424 . 4 (i.e.. ► 100,000 '5000 ).	 ,/	 ('t'h i :^ calrul . ► t ion ;► ;^sume a
that ti:e bidders are risk neutral. Bidders' risk aversion would prob-
ably lead to a smaller number of applicants.) In our analysis, we
assume three applicants participate in the auction.
The reason the suction attracts so many fewer bidders that ► tilt:
S'	 lottery is not hard to discover. The auction makes bidders- pay for
their license. Net
 of this payment, if can be shown that they make
C	 "almost normal" profits. On the other hand, the lotter y pj%e s its
l'	 winner all of the quasi-rent.
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Table R
Comparison of Assignment Costs
For a "Typical" MDS License
Comparative
Hearing Lottery Auction
Costs of Administration $ 5,400 S 5,000 $ 5,000
I
Costs to Applicants 137,500 20,000 20,000
Opportunity Costs of 10 000 5 000 5,000
'Idle Assignment* _— '	 _ __ '__-
Total Cost $102,900 $30,000 $30,000
* Assumes 10% discount rate.
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GTo complete the illustration of costs, Table 8 presents a compari-
son of the three methods. In it, we have used the typical value of
$100,000 in calculating the opportunity costs. As shown in the table,
both the lottery and the auction are less costly than the present system
of comparative hearings. However, despite the fact that the cost of
participating in the lottery is one-fifth the cost of participating in
the auction, the total cost of all resources used by lottery participants
is as large as for the auction because the lottery has many more compet-
ing applicants.
Although auctions and lotteries are shown as having equal costs,
different choices of costs and the number of participants could swing
the comparison in Table 8 in favor of one or the other. Indeed, it is
probably true that each technique may be least costly under certain
circumstances. What seems clear is that both auctions and lotteries
probably are less costly than the comparative hearing. This cost
saving is achieved by reducing (1) the opportunity cost of the idle
assignment, and (2) the total cost of participating in the assignment
process.
The auction and lottery also differ from the present system in
their distribution of gains and losses. In general, the biggest gainer
in the lottery is the successful applicant. In the auction, a large
share of the license's value is transferred to the government through
the auction payment. The intermediaries receive less under either
proposed :alternative than under the present system.
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6. CONCLUSION
A radio license assigns specific rights to the use of the frequency
spectrum to particular groups of individuals. These rights depend on
the technical inputs that the licensee is allowed to use (antenna
height, power, and so forth), and on the services to be offered. If
the most valuable bundle of services, the least-cost way to deliver
them, and the impact of that delivery method on spectrum were known in
F4 (,	 advance, the rights specified in the license could be defined optimal?y,
and an "optimal" assignment mode.
The present system of assigning licenses using an administrative
process is, as shown above, costly and suboptimal. In the comparatively
tiny IDS service, the costs of assignment were estimated above to be
almost as large as the value of the license. The costs associated with
economically more important services (e.g., television broadcasting or
domestic satellites) may bear a comparable relationship to the much
larger value of the licenses.
The traditional response to situations where the demand for spec-
trum exceeds its supply has been to allocate more spectrum. Although
this system's costs cannot be estimated without a knowledge of the value
lost when other services are displaced, our analysis has shown that this
"solution" may require dramatic increases in spectrum if those areas of
the country with the most intense demands are to be satisfied. Such
increases (because they are carried out on a national basis), are likely
to leave much of the increased allocation idle or underused elsewnere.
In contrast, auctions and lotteries of spectrum have lower costs
than the administrative system. The auction system has the additional
-42-
t
not inconsequential advantage of revealing the value of particular
spectrum, through the bidding mechanism. This information can be used
to make decisions about how much additional spectrum ought to be
allocated to a particular service.
i
i
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LFOOTNOTES
*	 Research for this paper was supporter) by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration's contract NASW-3204. Some of the work is
based on a previous study supported by the National Telecommunica-
tions and Information Administration at Mathtech, Inc.
FCC Common Carrier Docket 80-116, Notice of Inquiry and Notice of
3
	 Proposed Rulemaking, issued March 19, 1980.
2/ The rules governing MDS are contained in Part 21, Subpart K of the
FCC's Rules and Regulations (47 CFR 1), hereafter cited as FCC
Rules.
31 Report and Order, Docket 19493, 35 FCC 2nd 154 (1972) and 45 FCC
2nd 616 (1974), reconsideration denied 57 FCC 2nd 301 (1975).
4/ FCC Docket 80-112, p. 9.
5/ Prior to Ashbacker, the FCC apparently set some conflicting appli-
cations for a hearing, but issued a license without a hearing
(presumably after a public interest finding) in other cases.
326 U.S. 338, n. 1.
61 Docket 80-116, p. 28.
E.g., Butters (1975). See Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1980) for a survey
of this and other auction mechanisms.
8/ The Communications Act of 1934, Section 309(d) specifies a thret-
F	 year term for broadcasters' licenses and a five-;;ear terra for all
other radio licenses.
9/ When the total number of applications is odd, there must be one
t	 more application for one channel or the other. Thus, a situation
where there are two applicants for channel one and three applicants
for channel Lwo counts as an "even" split.
s
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10/ The implication of this equilibrium condition is that each appli-
cant assesses the probability of winning to be 1/n i . Since only
one out of the n applicants can be awarded the assignment, thisi
assumption seems reasonable ex post. However, there is obviously
`t	 no reason why individuals should necessarily view their chances
in this way ex ante. Taking their ex ante probability to be 1/nI
is an additional assumption in this model.
11/ For examples of the techniques that could be used, see Hausman and
Wise (1978) and Heckman (1977).
12/ Estimates of the value of a "typical" VHF television station, for
example, based on capitalization calculations, are around $2 million
(Crandall, 1978). VEIF stations owned and operated by one of the
three major networks, all of which are in the top television markets,
may be worth almost $60 million dollars each (Webbink, 1978).
13/ This fraction is based on the amortized value of the license, and
is given by 1 -(1+  r) -T --where r is the discount rate and T is the
length of the delay. For r - 0.10 and T - 3 this factor is 0.25.
14/ As pointed out by Kim Degnan if some of the FCC's proposals are
adopted, the spectrum used may have a positive value in an alternative
use because MDS will share an allocation with two other services,
ITFS and POFS.
15/ These markets are those listed as among the top fifty in FCC D--k-ec
80-112. That list includes six ADI's that are not included in the
1975 data on which the regression equation is based.
16/ See Wilson (1977).
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